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The allocation problem, arbitrary allocations, and incorrigible 
allocations are all commonly used phrases in the accounting literature. 
Thomas is credited with the current concern for cost allocations. 1 
Allocation is defined as the partitioning or assigning of costs or 
revenues to items such as time periods, long-term assets, or activities 
(e.g., divisions) within an entity. For example, depreciable assets, 
inventories, prepayments, labor services, research and development, and 
advertising are inputs that are partitioned to time periods in the form 
of expense or cost of goods manufactured. The purchase price of a 
basket purchase, the purchase of a group of long-term assets as one unit, 
is partitioned to the individual long-term assets. Joint or common costs 
such as income taxes, financing costs, and general and administrative 
expenses are assigned to activities within an entity. This study will 
address the allocation of joint costs to activities within an entity. 
1Arthur L. Thomas, "The Allocation Problem in Financial Accounting 
Theory," Studies in Accounting Research No. 3, 1969. 
1 
2 
Statement of the Problem 
Introduction 
A decision required of many accountants is the selection and justi-
fication of particular allocation methods employed in cost allocation 
situations. The allocation problem in accounting is the inability of 
accountants to justify the particular allocation methods selected. The 
allocation problem circumscribes the problems of cost accumulation and 
of matching costs with revenues. According to Thomas, a solution to the 
allocation problem requires identification of allocation methods which 
satisfy three requirements: 
1. The method should be unambiguous. 
2. It should be possible to defend the method. 
3. The method should divide up what is available to be 
allocated, no more and no less. The allocation should be 
additive.1 
To be unambiguous an allocation scheme should result in a unique 
solution. In other words, there should be but one solution. 
Thomas stated that the defense of an allocation method requires 
some type of theoretical justification. Justification can be in the 
form of assumptions or axioms which are not subject to conclusive 
demonstration or proof. Further justification would be the general 
acceptance of an allocation method by the parties involved (mutual 
satisfaction) and a demonstration that the allocation of cost is a 
consequent of the assumptions or axioms. 
2Arthur L. Thomas, "The Allocation Problem in Financial Accounting 
Theory," Studies in Accounting Research No. 3, 1969, p. 7. 
The final requirement additivity, is very basic. An allocation 
scheme must divide up exactly, the amount of total cost. 
Scope Limitation 
3 
While Thomas asserts that the allocation problem is applicable to 
all classes of accounting allocation, in Studies in Accounting Research 
No. 3, he addresses only those allocations that deal with financial 
accounting. Thomas' research study primarily discusses the class of 
cost allocations that have a direct effect on income determiniation and 
asset valuation (balance sheet numbers). 
A class of allocations not discussed by Thomas, but also related to 
the allocation problem, is an allocation that involves the assignment 
of joint or common costs to different activities (divisions) within an 
entity. Joint costs are accumulated in a number of ways; for example, 
income taxes are incurred due to the legal process; financing costs are 
incurred generally through borrowing capital; and general and admini-
strative expenses are incurred.due to a need for the service function 
within an organization. 
Income taxes, financing costs, and general and administrative 
expenses are not generally traceable directly to a specific activity 
within an entity. The aforementioned costs are incurred by the entity 
to assist the different activities of its business for the purpose of, 
or as a result of, earning revenue. For example, income taxes are 
incurred by the entity as a result of the total revenue earned due to 
the combined effort of the different activities. Financing costs, and 
general and administrative costs are incurred by the entity as a result 
of the combined effort of the different activities that precede the 
4 
earning of revenue. Thus, the entity incurs costs of this nature in 
relationship to the revenue earning process. Since the revenue earning 
process is a combined effort of the various activities within an entity, 
the aforementioned costs are traceable indirectly to the various 
activities and are allocated to each activity. 
Some joint costs are incurred because a benefit (e.g., cost 
savings) is perceived by decision makers. An example would be the cost 
two or more managers incur by jointly leasing a copy machine, rather 
than using the more costly copy machine service supplied by their 
employer (a corporation). The allocation of joint costs incurred where 
a benefit is perceived by decision makers will be addressed in this 
research study. 
Thomas issued a challenge to accounting researchers to develop 
theoretical justification for allocation methods or to avoid allocations 
completely. Since abandonment is infeasible given the current state of 
the accounting art, a solution is essential. 
Purpose of the Study 
Thomas stated that the three aforementioned requirements that serve 
to justify a financial accounting allocation scheme, could apply to the 
class of allocations involving the assignment of joint costs. He 
suggested that further research was required in the area of joint cost 
allocation. Therefore, the purpose of the research reported in this 
dissertation was to evaluate the behavior of subjects, acting as 
surrogate division martagers, in a joint cost allocation setting where 
the cost savings were available to each division manager. The allocation 
5 
of joint costs reported by the groups was analyzed to ascertain if some 
game theoretic allocation scheme was approximated. 
Cooperative game theory3 is applicable in allocation situations 
where a benefit (e.g., synergy, arbitrage, or cost savings) is perceived 
by the players4 for forming a coalition(s); 5 thus, game theory might 
serve as a theoretical justification for allocation schemes of this 
class. The subject of the reported research study was a laboratory 
experiment of a cost allocation situation involving the allocation of 
joint costs. The observed partitioning of cost savings was analyzed to 
make inferences about group behavor as viewed from a game theoretic 
perspective. Joint costs were allocated by the groups. Cost savings 
allocations were analyzed because game theoretic allocation schemes are 
generally formulated from the viewpoint of cost savings, arbitrage, or 
synergy. Identical statistical results occurred whether analyzing the 
joint cost allocations or the cost savings allocations. 
Game Theory 
Historical Background 
In an attempt to solve the allocation problem in accounting, 
accounting researchers have introduced the use of game theory. Social 
scientists, mathematicians and economists have applied the theory of 
games in many decision making contexts. 
3 Cooperative game theory is a game theoretic allocation where the 
participants are allowed to communicate with one another and bargain or 
negotiate for a solution that is acceptable to all the participants. 
4 
Player is the term used for each participant in a game. 
5 A coalition is a group formed by some or all of the players. 
6 
Game theory is a branch of mathematics and is built on assertions 
which can be proved to be true if certain other assertions are true. 
Thus, game theory is basically a collection of theorems derived from 
axioms. The axioms defend a chosen allocation scheme against competing 
alternatives. 
The solutions that result from game theoretic techntques are unique. 
Also, each technique is additive. Therefore, allocation methods using a 
game theoretic approach are theoretically justified because they meet the 
three minimum requirements proposed by Thomas. 
Definition of Game Theory 
A working definition of game theory is the theory of interest 
conflict. From the viewpoint of one of the players, the ultimate outcome 
depends on the actions of the other players. Each player attempts to 
select that move6 which will benefit him most based on his partial 
influence over the game solution. 
Game theory is comprised of three levels of abstraction; in 
ascending order they are extensive, normal and the characteristic 
function. Extensive form, the least abstract, involves the expression 
of each player's outcome in terms of utility. The normal form is a 
reduction of every game in extensive form that limits every player to 
one move and one move only. The characteristic function form, the most 
abstract, involves the assignment of a value of a game to each subset of 
players forming a coalition. The value is assigned as a c·onsequence of 
6A move is the set of choices a player has at a particular decision 
point. 
7 
the rules of the specific game. The characteristic function form of the 
game is applicable to cost allocation and is the primary form employed 
in this study. 
Development of Game Theory Applications to 
Management Accounting 
The study of game theory seems to have evolved from mathematics, to 
the behavioral sciences, and finally to business applications in 
economics and accounting. Even though Shubik 1 s 7 1962 study set the tone 
in accounting, it did not attract much interest until the early 1970's. 
Thomas's allocation problem research study in 1969 seems to have 
instigated the current interest in game theory as applied to cost 
allocation. 
The application of game theory to accounting cost allocation can be 
traced to Shubik in 1962. He described, through the use of axioms, how 
the managers of a decentralized firm could make choices which were best 
for the individual decision maker and the overall organization. The 
allocation scheme he used was the Shapley value. 
Prior to Shubik, game theory literature was primarily a phenomena 
of the behavioral sciences. 8 von Neumann and Morgenstern and Luce and 
9 Raiffa, wrote texts that seem to have pioneered the application of game 
theory to laboratory situations. 
7Martin Shubik, "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment 
of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Management Science, 8 (April, 1962), 
pp. 325-343. 
8 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior (New York, 1953). 




A laboratory experiment was conducted using 75 business students 
as surrogate division managers. The subjects were randomly partitioned 
into groups of three, each of which simulated a division managers' 
meeting. The problem each group confronted was how to get computer 
printed weekly reports to corporate headquarters at a prescribed time. 
Two decisions had to be made by each group. The first decision they 
had to make was whether to use an outside computer facility or a computer 
facility made available within the corporation. The second decision 
required was the partitioning of any joint costs to each division. 
Data needed to test the hypotheses of this study were gathered from 
the two decisions required of each group. The surrogate division 
managers had the choice of using an outside computer facility, alone or 
10 
as a group, or using the computer facility within the corporation, 
alone or as a group. Group formation data were required to evaluate 
the subjects' coalition formation. 
Group behavior was compared with three elements of game theory: 
coalition formation, core theory, and game theoretic cost allocation 
schemes. The concept of coalition (collusion) formation involves the 
separation of the participants of a game into a group or a number of 
groups. The formation of coalitions is a conunon phenomenon of conflict 
11 
situations, and such is the case in game theory. Thus, coalition 
formation is a vital step in the determination of the results of a game. 
10 A group of this case could only be two division, because that was 
the maximum the outside computer facility could increase its capacity and 
still promise timely delivery. 
11R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York, 
1967)' p. 8. 
9 
Core is defined as the set of payoffs.that are required for players 
to remain in a coalition. Each participani:·inust receive at"least"the 
amount he could command regardless of how the participants who are not 
members of the coalition behave. 
The game theoretic cost allocation schemes employed in this research 
study were the Shapley, Bargaining Theory--Initial Trial and Bargaining 
Theory--Asymptote. The Shapley cost allocation scheme is based on a 
marginal cost concept. As the grand coalition, the coalition that 
includes all of the participants of a game, forms by the sequential 
addition of players, each player is charged an amount equal to the 
expected marginal cost incurred when the player enters the grand coali-
tion. Bargaining theory--Initial Trial is based on parity, a player's 
percentage contribution to a coalition, and equality. Thus, the payoff 
to each player in a coalition is expected to be midway between parity 
and equality. Bargaining Theory--Asymptote assumes that the members of 
a coalition will use their best payoff in other coalitions as an element 
of threat to increase their payoff. 
Two joint cost allocation schemes that are not game theoretic were 
also employed in this research study: the Activity Level and Moriarity 
joint cost allocation schemes. The Activity Level joint cost allocation 
scheme partitions the total joint cost as a percentage of each 
participant's hours contributed towards the incurrence of the joint cost. 
The Moriarity joint cost allocation schemes partitions the total joint 
cost savings as a percentage of each participant's cost of acting alone. 
For testing purposes, hypotheses were constructed based on the 
aforementioned elements of game theory. The hypotheses were as follows: 
1. Each group would form a grand coalition. A grand coalition 
is composed of all the participants in a game. Refer to 
Appendix C for the details of grand coalition formation. 
2. The observed allocations of cost savings would be core 
solutions. Appendix D discloses the core calculations. 
3. A game theoretic allocation scheme would be approximated by 
the subjects. Refer to Appendix D for solutions for the 
allocation schemes employed in this research study. 
4. Each allocation scheme that was compared with the observed 
allocation schemes had an equal probaQility of occurrence, 
.20 (1/5). 
Based on the information provided to the subjects, bargaining 
theory of coalition formation predicted grand coalitions would form. 
10 
The observed percentage of groups that formed grand coalitions was used 
to compute confidence intervals as an estimate for a population pro-
portion. 
The cost savings allocations reported by the groups were used three 
ways. First, the observed allocations were individually evaluated to 
determine if they were core soluations. An allocation scheme was 
considered in core if three rationality conditions were met. The 
rationality conditions were as follows: 
1. Each player to remain in the grand coalition must receive 
a payoff that is at least as great as the payoff he could 
receive acting alone. 
2. The grand coalition must allocate the total benefit of 
cooperation to the players. 
3. Every possible coalition must behave rationally. That is, 
the payoffs to each player must be as great as the benefit 
of their cooperation.l2 
12s. S. Hamlen, W. A. Hamlen, and J. T. Tschinhart, "The Use of 
Core Theory in Evaluating Joint Cost Allocation Schemes," The Accounting 
Review, 52 (July, 1977), p. 618. 
11 
Second, the observed allocations were compared with five allocation 
schemes. Three of the allocation schemes, the Shapley, Bargaining 
Theory--Initial Trial, and Bargaining Theory--Asymptote, were game 
theoretic models. The remaining two schemes, Activity Level and 
Moriarity, although often employed in game theoretic research, were not 
clearly defined as game theoretic models. Each of the five allocation 
schemes was compared with the mean of the observed allocations. A 
2 Retelling's T statistic was computed for each of the five comparisons. 
The most closely approximated allocation scheme(s) was indicated by the 
lowest T2 statistic. 
2 Finally, a X goodness of fit statistic was utilized to lend 
2 2 
support to the Retelling's T statistic. Since Retelling's T used 
mean data, the statistic could be influenced by observations that were 
extremely diverse from one of the five known allocations. 
2 X is a summary statistic, thus extreme observations do not 
influence (lead to possible incorrect inferences) its results. Five 
allocation schemes were being compared with the observed allocations, 
therefore each of the five allocation schemes had an equal probability 
(20 percent) of occurrence. The allocation scheme that contributed the 
highest amount toward the overall x2 statistic was also an indication 
of the allocation scheme most closely approximated by the groups. 
Preview of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter II contains a detailed specification of the research 
methodology. Also encompassed in Chapter II is a literature review 
supporting each hypothesis and the limitations of the research 
methodology. 
12 
The results of the research study are disclosed in Chapter III. 
Group behavior is evaluated with regard to three elements of game theory: 
coalition formation, core theory, and game theoretic solutions. The test 
statistics employed for evaluative purposes are defined and their results 
are analyzed. 
Chapter IV contains a summary of the research study and the results 
of the experiment. Inferences are made concerning group behavior and 
implications of the research study are formulated. 
A selected bibliography and appendixes follow the summary. The 
appendixes are developed to assist the reader with basic game theory 
terminology and to disclose the pertinent computations used in data 
analyses. 
CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
A vast majority of game theory research has been either descriptive 
or laboratory in nature. Very little real data based research has been 
done to date, and in accounting, the only research study of this type 
1 was a manuscript drafted by Boatsman and Hansen. The primary purpose 
of the Boatsman and Hansen study was to investigate the predictive 
ability of game theory with regard to exchange ratios in stock for 
stock mergers. 
The shortage of real data based game theoretic research in 
accounting is due to the unavailability of data. Most gaming situations 
are of an internal (within the firm) nature (i.e., cost allocations). 
Internal (not requiring disclosure) information is not generally 
available to the public, thus there is a lack of data required for such 
studies. Since real data are not available, researchers have had to 
generate their own data in the laboratory. 
1 
James Boatsman and Don R. Hansen, "Game Theoretic Approaches to 
Allocations: Evidence from Business Combinations," (unpublished 
manuscript, 1980), pp. 1-36. 
13 
14 
Instrumentation and Subjects. 
Game theory is applicable in allocation situations where a benefit 
(e.g., synergy or cost savings) is perceived by the players for forming 
a coalition(s). Therefore, this study evaluated the decisions that 
subjects, acting as dividion managers, made regarding the partitioning 
of cost savings generated by forming a coalition and using an internal 
(within the firm) computer facility rather than an outside facility. 
The situation that was presented to the subjects is as follows: 2 
You are the manager of division (A; B, or C). The corporation 
has recently developed a new dividion, D, which is strictly a 
computer service division. Dividion D leases its computer at 
a fixed rate of $5,010 per week. 
In recent weeks the divisional weekly accounting and production 
reports, which are handwritten, have been received well past 
the due date (Monday morning, 9:00a.m.). Also, the corporate 
staff has had a difficult time integrating the divisional 
reports because the reports were not uniform. Therefore, 
corporate headquarters issued to each division manager a memo 
stating that their quarterly bonuses would be reduced 
accordingly for any more tardy weekly reports. Also, a uniform 
format for the weekly reports was attached. It was also made 
clear in the memo that computer printed reports would be 
required. 
Today is Friday, the day division managers have their weekly 
meeting .. One week from the following Monday is the day 
penalties will be assessed for tardy reports. 
You and the other division managers have just heard presenta-
tions from outside computer firms and from Division D, the new 
computer division. (Cost estimates and each division's 
computer requirements are attached.)3 Each presenter stressed 
that they could guarantee timely reports, one week from 
Monday, only if they could get started this afternoon. 
Therefore, time is of the essence. 
2 A sample of the test instrument employed in the laboratory 
experiment is available in Appendix E. 
3 . 
See Appendix B. 
You as a division manager now face this dilemma: How to get 
weekly reports, computer printed, to the corporate office 
every Monday by 9:00 a.m. 
Here are some additional considerations: 
1. You may decide to act alone, or form a group with one, 
or both, of the other division managers. 
2. One of the criteria used to evaluate your performance 
for determining your quarterly bonus is cost savings 
you can verify when making investment decisions. (i.e., 
Cost to make a raw material $100; cost to buy the raw 
material, $75. If the decision maker buys the raw 
material, his cost savings would be $25.) 
The decision you must make is: 
A. What computer facility should your division use (either 
Division D or an outside facility)? 
B. If you and another, or both other divisions, decide to 
form a group, how should the cost (see attached cost 
figures) be allocated or partitioned to the using 
divisions? 
15 
The subjects were informed orally, just prior to the beginning of 
the experiment, that the amount of their payoff would be based on the 
quality (soundness) of their decisions. Seventy-five (7 5) subjects wer.e 
employed in the experiment and each subject was randomly assigned the 
role of a division manager (Division A~ B, or C). Groups composed of 
one division manager from each of the three divisions were formed and 
the decision making process commenced. 
Senior business students were used as the surrogates for division 
managers. They were selected because they should have completed a 
majority of the basic business college requirements and thus, should be 
somewhat familiar with the role and responsibilities of a division 
manager. 
16 
Development of Hypotheses 
Introduction 
The behavior of the subjects, acting as surrogate division managers, 
was evaluated. The evaluation involved a comparison of the subjects' 
behavior with three elements of game theory: coalition formation, core 
theory, and game theoretic allocation schemes. 
Coalition Formation 
Eight possible coalitions4 can be formed in a three-person game. 5 
Coalition formation is important because it has implications concerning 
players' behavior, and game theoretic solutions and their axioms. 
Gameson6 in 1961 developed a theory of coalition formation. He 
sought to predict who would join with whom to form coalitions in 
specific instances. His model required the following information: 
1. The initial distribution of resources. 
2. The payoff for each coalition. 
3. The non-utilitarian strategy preferences. 
4. The effective decision point. 
He assumed that all the players had the same information about the 
initial distribution of resources and the payoffs to all coalitions, 
4 The eight possible coalitions are: (1), (2), (3), (1,2), (1,3), 
( 2 , 3) , ( 1 , 2 , 3) , and the empty set • 
5 The experiment employed in this research study was a three-person 
game. The three-persons were the three surrogate division managers 
assigned to each of the 25 groups. 
6 William A. Gameson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation," American 
Sociological Review (October, 1961), pp. 373-382. 
17 
that all the players had a ranking of non-utilitarian preferences for 
joining with the other players, and that the players did not distinguish 
between payoffs in the same payoff class. 
Based on the above assumptions, Gameson hypothesized a minimum 
7 resource theory of coalition formation. The theory was compared with 
8 Caplow's prediction theory. Gameson found that two theories to be 
identical when the payoffs and non-utilitarian strategy preferences 
were constant. 
9 10 11 . 
In the early 1970's Conrath, Chertkoff, and Komorita 1ntroduced 
laboratory studies that sought to answer questions about the formation 
of coalitions. Conrath's results indicated that not only was experience 
a determining variable in subject behavior, but also communication and 
. 12 
size and dominance of the payoffs were important variables. 
7 A player will expect the other players to demand from a coalition 
a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources they con-
tribute to the coalition. 
8The initial distribution of resources is the primary element in 
the prediction of coalition formation. (See Appendix A.) 
9navid W. Conrath, "Experience as a Factor in Experimental Gaming 
Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (June, 1970), pp. 195-202. 
10 Jerome M. Chertkoff, "Coalition Formation as a Function of 
Differences in Resources," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15 (September, 
1971), PP• 371-383. 
11 S. S. Komorita and Jerome Chertkoff, "Psychological Bargaining 
Theory of Coalition Formation," Psychological Review, 80 (May, 1973), 
pp. 149-162. 
12A payoff is better than another payoff if it is feasible and 
preferred. (See Appendix A.) 
18 
Chertkoff tested various theories and found that Gameson's minimum 
resource theory was most often accurate. Komorita and Chertkoff proposed 
a predictive theory, bargaining theory, that they compared with minimum 
13 resources and pivotal power theories. Their theory opposed the other 
two because they assumed that differences in resources would cause people 
to adopt different orientations toward the reward division (minimum 
resource and pivotal power assume people have the same orientation toward 
the reward division). Based on this difference and other subtle 
differences, the data gathered supported their proposed theory. 
Bargaining theory of coalition formation postulates that the most 
likely coalition to form is the one that minimizes coalition members' 
temptation to leave a coalition. The temptation to defect is defined 
14 by the factor (Oij - Eij). The smaller the factor, the less likely 
that members will defect. In other words, the coalition with the 
smallest factor is the coalition that is most likely to form. Within 
the context of the present research the coalition with the smallest 
factor, -.71, 15 was the grand coalition, therefore the first hypothesis 
of this dissertation research was that each group would form a grand 
coalition. 
13 A player's resources are pivotal when their inclusion in a 
losing coalition can convert it into a winning coalition. (See Appendix 
A.) 
14 . 
J. Keith Murnigham, "Strength and Weakness in Four Coalition 
Situations," Behavioral Science (May, 1978), p. 197. Oij =predicted 
reward of player i in coalition j; and Eij =maximum expectation in 
alternative coalitions. 
15 The computations of the temptation factors are in Appendix C. 
19 
Confidence intervals were calculated to test the above hypothesis. 
A binomial sample distribution16 existed because there were only two 
possible outcomes associated with each group of subjects. Confidence 
\ 
intervals are based on the normal distribution, but they do serve as 
an approximation to a binomial distribution. Therefore, oonfidence 
intervals were utilized in this research study to allow inferences to 
be made about the coalition formation behavior of the subjects. 
Core Theory 
The cost savings allocations reported by the groups were evaluated 
in terms of core theory. As discussed in Chapter I and Appendix A, 
core theory is the set of payoffs that are required for players to 
remain in a coalition. Core theory was most appropriate for this study 
because in situations where the marginal cost function for an allocated 
cost is decreasing (as it was in this study), suboptimal (at the corpor-
ate level) decisions on the divisional level can be avoided. 17 That is, 
core theory only recognizes as solutions those allocations that are 
stable. 
Stability of outcomes should be important to the accountant. If 
one of the objectives of game theory, in an accounting sense, is to 
save the cost of time-consuming-negotiation-processes in gaming 
16 
Binomial distribution is defined as a sampling situation that 
allows only two possible outcomes. The hypothesis concerning coalition 
.formation only allows these two possible outcomes:' _(1) a grand 
coalition will form; or (2) a grand coalition will not form. 
17s. S. Hamlen, W. A. Hamlen, and J. T. Tschirhart, "The Use of 
Core Theory in Evaluating Joint Cost Allocation Schemes," The Accounting 
Review, 52 (July, 1977), pp. 616-627. 
20 
situations, then the accountant (acting as an advisor) would have a more 
convincing case suggesting a stable allocation scheme. 
Jensen18 explored the negotiation process and how accountants could 
assist the negotiators (manager) in reaching a mutually satisfactory 
allocation19 of costs in a joint cost setting. He did not prescribe 
any specific allocation scheme. Rather, he strongly urged accountants 
to become familiar with game theoretic approaches for allocating joint 
costs. This knowledge, he suggests, could serve as valuable input to a 
group(s) of collaborators in attempting to reach a mutually satisfactory 
allocation of cost. 
20 Hughes and Scheiner questioned what they perceived as the current 
development of game theory in accounting research. Their opinion was 
21 that the current state of the art had ignored the efficiency properties 
of an allocation scheme. 22 In direct response to Jensen's research, 
Hughes and Scheiner implied that a mutually satisfactory allocation 
scheme is not a surrogate for the efficiency properties of that scheme. 
Their basic argument was that accounting researchers employing game 
theory must go a step further. They must evaluate allocation schemes, 
18 Daniel L. Jensen., "A Class .of Mutually Satisfactory Allocations," 
The Accounting Review, 52 (October, 1977), pp. 842-856. 
19 Those allocations whereby individuals or organizations agree 
to distributions of resources. 
20 JohnS. Hughes and James H. Scheiner, "EfficiencyProperties of 
Mutually Satisfactory Cost Allocations," The Accounting Review, 55 
(January, 1980), pp. 85-95. 
21 
Efficiency properties, as defined by Hughes and Scheiner, require 
that decisions made on a division level be optimal in the sense of the 
overall corporation. 
22 Jensen, pp. 842-856. 
21 
not just with the divisions (players) of a corporation in mind, but 
also with the overall corporation in mind. 
In games involving more than two players a possibility exists of 
more than one acceptable solution. Berl, McKelvey, Ordeshook, and 
23 Winer developed a theory to reduce the number of acceptable solutions. 
They made two critical assumptions that they felt would accomplish 
their purpose. The assumptions were: 
1. A coalition's value can be represented by a single 
number that corresponds to the amount of some divisible 
transferable commodity (e.g., money) the coalition can 
secure for its members. 
2. Each player's utility for the commodity is linear and 
hence transferable as well.24 
These assumptions, added to the general game theory framework, 
developed a solution named the core. Berl, McKelvey, Ordeshook, and 
Winer's laboratory experiment, which involved 17 games and 31 players, 
strongly supported the core as a solution. The results of their 
experiment were so supportive of core that even when players did not 
understand the theoretical properties of the game they were playing, 
they tended to end up in or near core anyhow. For games in which core 
does exist--especially for those games which correspond to a unique 
outcome--the theory offers a highly predictable outcome. 
Hamlen, Hamlen, and Tschirhart 25 used core theory to describe joint 
cost allocation schemes. Their primary purpose was to determine those 
23Janet E. Berl et al., "An Experimental Test of the Core in a 
Simple N-Person Cooperative nonside-Payment Game," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 20 (September, 1976), pp. 453-479. 
24 
Berl et al., p. 454. 
25 
Hamlen~ pp. 616-627. 
payoffs to the players that would be satisfactory enough to keep them 
in a particular coalition. The authors applied this theory to four 
joint cost allocation schemes: 
26 Activity Level, Shapley value, 
Nucleolus, and Moriarity. 27 
For a solution to be considered in core, three rationality 
conditions had to be met: 
1. Each player to remain in the grand coalition must receive 
a payoff that is at least .as great as the payoff he could 
receive acting alone. 
2. The grand coalition must allocate the total benefit of 
cooperation to the players. 
3. Every possible coalition must behave rationally. That 
is, the payoffs to each player must be at least as 
great as the benefit of their cooperation.28 
The avoidance of cost allocation schemes that would result in 
22 
sub-optimal decisions on the corporate level was the primary objective 
of the authors. They evaluated each cost allocation scheme on the 
basis of rationality and fairness, and neutrality, An allocation scheme 
was judged to be acceptable if the following criteria were met: 
26cost is allocated to each player in direct proportion to the 
player's activity level. (See Appendix A.) 
27 
The cost allocated to each player is equal to the difference 
between his independent cost and a specific fraction of the total 
value obtained by forming the grand coalition. (See Appendix A.) 
28 Hamlen, p. 618, and Karl Henrik Borch, The Economics of 
Uncertainty (New Jersey, 1972), pp. 154-155. Core conditions in 
notation are: 
1) Xi~ V({i}) for all i, Xi = payoff to i. 
n 
2) Z:: Xi= V(N), V(N) ... payoff to grand coalition. 
i=l 
3) Z:: Xi~ V(S) for all S in N. 
ie:s 
1. Each division received a charge which was less than the 
cost it would incur by acting alone. 
2. The total sum of all costs to all divisions had to be 
equal to the total joint cost to the corporation. 
3. The allocation scheme resulted in a set of payoffs 
which were in core. 
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Three of the four allocation schemes did result in core solutions. 
Only the Moriarity scheme's solution was outside of the core. The 
authors also introduced some useful information about the other cost 
allocation schemes which they examined. Both the Shapley value and 
nucleolus s·chemes tended to favor the smaller divisions. Even though 
the larger divisions contributed a proportionately larger part of the 
joint cost savings, the two schemes divided the savings evenly among 
all the divisions. The Activity Level scheme favored the smaller 
divisions even more. 
Thus, a second hypothesis of this dissertation research was that 
the solution observed from each group would be in core. The solutions 
derived by each group might not be comparable to any game theoretic 
solution, but they could still be in core. The inference in such cases 
must be that some of the axioms underlying game theoretic solutions 
are too restrictive. 
Cost Allocation Schemes 
Finally, the most important aspect of the subjects' behavior that 
was evaluated was the game theoretic solution, if any, that was employed 
by the groups. To date, the accounting literature has not furnished 
enough evidence to gain a consensus regarding a game theoretic approach 
to joint cost allocations as a possible solution to the allocation 
24 
problem. As discussed in Chapter I, the allocation problem is the 
inability of accountants to justify the particular allocation methods 
selected. The accounting literature does seem to be gathering evidence 
that supports the use of certain allocation schemes (e.g., Shapley 
and .Shapley related solutions, Minimum Resource Theory, and Bargaining 
Theory). 
. 29 
The empirical study by Boatsman and Hansen revealed some 
interesting evidence in support of game theory in an accounting setting. 
They applied a game theory framework (Shapley value, Minimum Resource 
Theory, and Bargaining Theory) 30 to predict exchange ratios associated 
with mergers (stock for stock only) during the period 1974-1976. They 
discovered that the Shapley solution did not incorporate the threat 
31 powers of the players. Boatsman and Hansen modified the Shapley 
solution by integrating Minimum Resource Theory and Bargaining Theory. 
The weight normally applicable to each player in a Shapley, two-person 
game solution is 1/2. Boatsman and Hansen altered these weights so as 
to reflect the threat strength of each player. They used earnings the 
32 year prior to the merger as the relative threat strength of the players. 
29 Boatsman, . pp. 1-36. 
30 This tenet suggests that players use their best payoff in another 
coalition as a threat to improve their payoff in a current coalition. 
(See Appendix A.) 
31The players in this setting were the stockholder groups of each 
firm. 
32Assume two firms A and B. The relativa strength of each firm was 
calculated as follows: 
A = Income ·Year Prior to Merger for A 
Income Year Friar to Merg~r ·. for A+B 
B = Income Year Prior to Merger for B Income Year Prior to Merger for A+B 
25 
Results after applying the modified model provided strong evidence 
in support of Minimum Resource and Bargaining Theories. 
33 . h h Roth and Verrecchia extended the current researc in game t eory 
as it applies to the allocation of cost. Previous accounting research 
tended to favor the Shapley solution, thus the authors' purpose was to 
further refine the Shapley technique for accounting application. 
The authors added three assumptions to the general game theory 
framework for the Shapley solution and deduced a theorem. The 
assumptions served as surrogates for the qualitative factors fairness, 
equity, and neutrality. Roth and Verrecchia theorized that "a manager's 
expected utility for playing in a game is equal to this Shapley value, 
34 if and only if, his preferences obey the above assumptions." 
Roth and Verrecchia's study was not data based, thus they proved 
their theorem mathematically. They concluded by saying that their 
refined model depends entirely on managers behaving as prescribed by 
the three assumptions. The implication was that laboratory and real 
data research were needed to support their theorem. 
One of the few studies using real data and applying game theory 
35 was done by Littlechild and Thompson for the Birmingham Airport in 
England. They investigated various pricing policies where the cost of 
runway construction was to be shared by the different.aircraft models 
33Alvin E. Roth and Robert E. Verrecchia, "The Shapley Value as· 
Applied to Cost Allocation: A Reinterpretation," Journal of Accounting 
Research (April, 1979), pp. 295-303. 
34Roth, p. 301. 
35s. C. Littlechild nd G F Th m "A" ft L d. F a • •· · o pson, J.rcra an ~ng ees: 
A Game Theory Approach," The Bell Journal of Economics (Spring, 1977), 
PP· 186-206. 
26 
(types). Game theory was employed along with linear programming to 
insure optimality, efficiency, and fairness in the curr~ntly used 
pricing structure and to derive some rules of thumb for allocating 
costs. The currently used pricing structure was compared with the 
results suggested by linear programming and three game theory approaches, 
36 the Shapley value, nucleolus and anti-nucleolus. In general, the 
currently used pricing structure was consistent with the linear 
programming results and the Shapley value. 
The application of game theory to the relationship between an 
information evaluator and a decision maker was the intent of a recent 
37 study by Sundem. Sundem asserted that a gaming situation existed 
because each person (information evaluator and decision maker) could 
influence the payoffs to the other. Each person had the ability to 
increase his payoff by gaining knowledge of the other's alternatives 
and payoffs. 
By varying the level of communication, the amount of information 
(complete or incomplete), and side paym~nts (allowed ·or disallowed), 
Sundem developed game theoretic models for six (6) situations. His 
results were not conclusive, but interestingly he found that ambiguous 
solution concepts resulted in the cooperative game settings. 
36This solution minimizes the maximum surplus. (See Appendix A, 
Nucleolus.) 
37 
Gary L. Sundem, "A Game Theory Model of the Information Evaluator 
and the Decision Maker," Journal of ·Accounting Research, 17 (Spring, 
1979), pp. 243-261. 
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38 Spinetto in 1975 reintroduced the application. of game theory to 
the business setting (e.g., cost allocation within and between firms). 
His primary purpose was to illustrate how cooperative games could assist 
arbitrators in selecting fair solutions in the resolution of conflicts 
among several parties. He described how an arbitrator could propose 
one solution that would be satisfactory to all the players. Applying 
the Shapley value he was able to illustrate that a single solution, 
termed fair to all parties was possible. 
Accounting researchers have yet to gather substantial evidence that 
supports one particular game theoretic cost allocation scheme. The 
Shapley solution has been the most utilized game theoretic technique in 
accounting research involving the allocation problem. The results of 
research utilizing the Shapley solution have been inconclusive and this 
lack of conclusive evidence could imply that some other game theoretic 
allocation scheme might be appropriate for accounting cost allocations. 
Therefore, five allocation schemes39 were utilized in this research 
study. Each of the five allocation schemes was compared with the allo-
cation schemes disclosed by the subjects. 
2 
A Retelling's T test 
statistic was employed to test the results of the five comparisons. 
For testing purposes, the third hypothesis of this research study was: 
38 Richard D. Spinetto, "Fairness in Cost Allocation and Cooperative 
Games," Decision Sciences, 6 (July, 1975), pp. 482-491. 
39 The five allocation schemes employed were the Shapley, Bargaining 
Theory--Initial Trial, Bargaining Theory--Asymptote, Activity Level, and 
Moriarity. The latter two schemes are not game theoretic models. See 
Appendix D for the solution to each method. 
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~0 was the vector of cost savings allocated to each division as 
calculated by one of five allocation schemes: the Shapley, Bargaining 
Theory--Initial Trial, Bargaining Theory--Asymptote, Activity Level or 
Moriarity. ~ was the mean vector of cost savings allocations disclosed 
by the subjects. 
The test statistic allowed the researcher to make inferences about 
allocation scheme preference and group behavior. The allocation schemes, 
(XA, XB, XC), reported by the subjects were compared with each of the 
aforementioned allocation schemes, ~0 (XA' XB, XC). Each comparison 
z· 
resulted in a Retelling's T • The level of significance associated with 
each T2 indicated how closely the observed allocation scheme approximated 
the allocation scheme with which it was being compared. The comparison 
resulting in the lowest level of significance connoted the most closely 
approximated allocation scheme. 
A summary statistic was also used to evaluate the results. Since 
five allocation schemes were tested, each scheme had an equal probability 
(20 percent) of being approximated by the subjects. Thus, each 
allocation scheme should have been the most closely approximated scheme 
20 percent of the time. 
Since each of the five allocation schemes had an equal probability 
of being most closely approximated by the subjects, a uniform distribu-
tion existed. A fourth hypothesis of this research study was formulated 
to determine whether or not the observed allocation schemes fit 
(approximated) a uniform distribution. Thus the fourth hypothesis of 
this research study was: 
H : 71' = 20% 
0 
H : 71' :f 20% 
a 
29 
TI was the probability of occurrence of each of the five allocation 
schemes. 
2 The hypothesis was tested using a X goodness of fit statistic. 
The x2 statistic was employed to gather knowledge about whether or not 
the observed data approximated the given distribution, i.e., each of 
the five allocation schemes tested had a probability of 20 percent 
occurrence. 
2 X lent support to the inferences that resulted from the Hotelling's 
T2 test. The most closely approximated allocation scheme, as inferred 
2 by Hotelling's T , was also disclosed by the allocation scheme contri-
2 buting the most to the X statistic. 
Limitations 
Typically in laboratory experiments the independent variables lack 
strength and may induce only weak responses. Also, the realism for-
feited makes generalization of the results a problem. 
However, laboratory studies have the advantage of allowing the 
researcher nearly complete control over the setting and the experiment 
by eliminating or controlling the influences of a large number of 
extraneous variables. Complete randomization is possible, and the 
researcher can manipulate numerous independent variables. Due to the 
unavailability of real data, this study employed a laboratory setting 
with the understanding that disadvantages (limitations) did exist. 
In addition, this particular research study was limited by the 
sample size and by the fact that students were used as the subjects. 
The small sample size, 23 observations, had an effect on the binomial 
distribution test that was approximated by confidence intervals and the 
2 
X statistic employed in this research study. 
30 
Even though the subjects employed in this research study were 
senior business students, their lack of experience· in the business 
sector and lack of negotiation ability or experience posed additional 
limitations. Inferences made concerning subjects', acting as surrogate 
division managers, decision making behavior may not be applicable to 
business sector division managers. 
Summary 
The research methodology was designed to enable the researcher to 
observe and evaluate subjects' behavior in a simulated business environ-
ment. Students, acting as surrogate division managers, were required 
to make decisions that are encountered by real world division managers. 
Predictions were made concerning the subjects' behavior. The 
subjects' observed behavior was evaluated in terms of three elements 
of game theory: coalition formation, core theory, and allocation scheme 
preference. 
Four hypotheses were formulated for the evaluation process. They · 
were as follows: 
1. Each group would form a grand coalition. 
2. Each group would report a core solution. 
3. The mean of the observed solutions would approximate one of 
five joint cost allocation schemes. 
4. Each allocation scheme would be approximated 20 percent of 
the time. 
Confidence intervals were computed to test the first hypothesis. 
An inference could be made about the proportion of groups that formed 
grand coalitions was the reason confidence intervals were utilized. 
31 
The second hypothesis was tested in terms of the three rationality 
conditions required for a solution to be considered a core solution. 
The rationality conditions are as follows: 
1. Each player to remain in the grand coalition must receive a 
paydff that is at least as great as the payoff he could 
receive acting alone. 
2. The grand coalition must allocate the total benefit of 
cooperation to the players. 
3. Every possible coalition must behave rationally. That is, 
the payoffs to each player must be at least as great as the 
benefit of their cooperation.4° 
Each observed solution (cost allocation scheme) was individually 
evaluated to determine if it met the three rationality conditions stated 
above. A percentage of observed solutions meeting the three requirements 
would be reported. 
Hypotheses three and four were formulated to evaluate the allocation 
scheme preference of the subjects. The third hypothesis utilized 
2 Hotelling's T statistic, which was calculated with the mean of the 
observation allocation schemes. The mean data were compared with the 
five known solutions; the Shapley, Bargaining Theory--Initial Trial, 
Bargaining Theory--Asymptote, Activity Level, and Moriarity. The 
comparison that resulted in the lowest Hotelling's T2 was inferred to 
be the most closely approximated allocation scheme. 
2 The fourth hypothesis utilized a summary statistic, X , for the 
purpose of evaluating the five comparisons mentioned above. Each 
observed allocation scheme was individually compared with the five 
known solutions. The numerical differences were squared and summed. 
40 
Hamlen, p. 618. 
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The known solution that resulted in the lowest summed squared 
difference was judged the most closely approximated solution. 
2 A x statistic was calculated to determine if the uniform distri-
bution (each of the five known solutions had dn equal probability of 
occurrence, 20 percent) was approximated by the sample distribution. 
The known solution that contributed the most (highest numerical value) 
2 to the X statistic was inferred to be the most closely approximated 
known solution (allocation scheme). 
The researcher anticipated that the results of this research study 
would make a contribution towards the resolution of the joint cost 
allocation problem in accounting when a benefit results in forming a 
coalition. The intent of this research study was to supply more 
evidence in support of game theoretic solutions, bargaining theory in 
regards to coalition formation, and the theory of core. Conclusive 
evidence would be a positive step in the direction of developing some 
theoretical justification of a cost allocation method for situations 
where a benefit is perceived by the players from forming a coalition(s). 
CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Introduction 
Twenty-five groups of three subjects participated in the experiment 
which served as the basis for data collection. Senior business students 
were utilized as the subjects because they were considered to be 
somewhat familiar with the role and responsibilities of a division 
manager. The experiment was conducted outside of the course require-
ments for the students' respective classes, and the data were collected 
during a two-day period at Oklahoma State University in Stillwater, 
Oklahoma. 
The subjects were told prior to the experiment that they would be 
rewarded in dollars for their participation. As no specified amount 
was mentioned, the subjects were led to believe that their payoffs were 
dependent on the quality (as determined by the experimenter) of their 
decisions. 
The above approach was utilized to create a competitive atmosphere. 
Game theory literature asserts that a benefit (in this experiment, a 
monetary payoff) must be perceived by the players for them to form a 
coalition(s). Thus, the monetary payoff was used as an incentive to 
induce the subjects to behave in a game theoretic manner. After all 
of the data were collected,. each subject was paid five dollars and 
debriefed about the experiment. 
33 
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The remainder of Chapter III includes the data collected from the 
experiment and an analysis of the results. Initially, coalition 
formation data were summarized and statistically tested with confidence 
intervals. The observed cost allocation schemes were then evaluated in 
terms of core theory. 
In addition, the observed allocation schemes were compared with 
five known allocation schemes. The comparisons were performed to 
determine which of the five known allocation schemes was most closely 
approximated by the subjects, acting as surrogate division managers. 
2 2 Retelling's T and X test statistics were used to evaluate the compari-
sons. Finally, the results of the research were summarized and 
implications of this research study were proposed. 
Participants' Cost Allocations 
The participants were instructed that they were expected to act as 
division managers. Each of the 25 consecutively numbered groups of three 
surrogate division managers was to assume that they were all a part of 
the same company. 
The division managers were asked to place themselves in a hypothe-
tical situation. The setting was a weekly division managers meeting, 
where one of the topics discussed was the utilization of a computer 
facility for the production of weekly accounting and production reports. 
The division managers had previously heard presentations from Division D, 
a new computer division organized within their company, and from various 
external computer firms. The amounts disclosed in Figure 1 are the 
lowest cost estimates and the cost savings available to each division 
and coalition. They were derived from the cost estimates submitted by 
35 
Cost Estimates Per Week: 
Division A - Acting Alone $2,610 
Division B - Acting Alone $2,030 
Division c - Acting Alone $1,070 
Divisions A and B - Coalition AB $4,260 
Divisions A and c - Coalition AC $3,390 
Divisions B and c - Coalition BC $2,835 
Divisions A, B, and C - Grand Coalition $5,010 
Cost Savings Per Week: 
Division A - Acting Alone $ 0 
Division B - Acting Alone $ 0 
Division c - Acting Alone $ 0 
Divisions A and B - Coalition AB $380 
Divisions A and c - Coalition AC $290 
Divisions B and c - Coalition BC $265 
Divisions A, B, and C - Grand Coalition $700 
Figure 1. Weekly Cost Estimates and Cost Savings Per Division 
and Coalition 
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Division D and the external computer firms. The amounts in Figure 1 
are used extensively throughout the remainder of Chapter III. 
Due to limited capacity, no single outside computer firm could 
accommodate all three divisions. Division D did have the excess 
capacity to accommodate the three divisions. The participants were 
given a summary of the lowest cost estimates and the division require-
ments for each of the three divisions, A, B, and C. The summary and 
division requirements appear in Appendix E. Using the cost estimates 
and division requirements, each division manager had to decide whether 
to utilize an outside computer facility, either alone or together with 
another division manager; or, to utilize Division D together with the 
other division managers. The division managers were allowed to discuss 
the situation in arriving at their decisions. 
1 . If a group (e.g., Divisions A.and B together using an outside 
computer facility and incurring a joint cost) was formed, an additional 
decision was required. The group members had to also decide how the 
joint cost was to be partitioned to the participating divisions (e.g., 
50%. to each division for a coalition of two), 
The decisions made by the 25 groups of subjects are summarized in 
Table I. Column one identifies the group number. The remaining columns 
signify the three divisions A, B, and C. Where a number other than 
zero appears in a division column, that symbolizes a coalition formation. 
For example, group 23 formed a grand coalition (group of three) as 
indicated by a number, other than zero, in the column for each division. 
1 
A group in game theory terminology is defined as a coalition. 
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Group 25 did not form any type of group as symbolized by the zeroes in 
each division column. 
TABLE I 
COALITION FORMATION AND THE ALLOCATION OF JOINT COST BY DIVISION 
Division 
Group A B c 
Number Fraction Dollars Fraction Dollars Fraction Dollars 
1-20 .48 $2,405 .35 $1,753 .17 $ 852 
21 .45 2,255 • 36 1,804 .19 951 
22 • 45 2,255 . 35 1,753 .20 1,002 
23 .47 2,354 • 36 1,804 .17 853 
24 .56 2,386 .44 1,874 0 0 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The decimal fractions in Table I indicate the portion of the 
joint cost allocated to a division as a result of forming a group. For 
example, the joint cost of all the divisions forming a gra~d coalition 
was $5,010. Group 23, which formed a grand coalition, partitioned the 
joint cost to each division in the following manner: 
7 ($2,354) i i ($1,804) . . 4 $5 , 010 , D vis on B, .36 $S,OlO , and Divis1on 
Division A, 
$ 852 
C, .17 ($5,010) • 
Group 24 on the other hand, formed a coalition of divisions A and B as 
indicated by the decimal franctions .56 and .44. The joint cost of 
divisions A and B forming a coalition was $4,260. Group 24 partitioned 
the joint cost in the following manner: Division A, .56 ($2,386) and 
Division B, .44 ($1,874). Since Division C was not a member of a 
38 
coalition, Division C was not involved in a joint cost situation; 
therefore Division C incurred $1,070 of cost, which was Division C's 
cost of acting alone. Groups 1-20 made identical decisions, therefore 
they were combined in Table I and throughout the remainder of the 
analysis process. 
Testing of Hypotheses 
Coalition Formation 
Bargaining theory of coalition formation predicts that in a game 
theoretic situation the coalition that minimizes members' temptation to 
leave a coalition will prevail. The subjects reinforced this theory in 
that 23 of the 25 groups, 92 percent, did form grand coalitions. 
The first hypothesis was that each group would form a grand 
coalition. The fact that 92 percent of the groups behaved as hypothe-
sized reflects substantial support for the bargaining theory of coalition 
formation. 
Additional support of the first hypothesis might also be gained by 
confidence intervals which were computed to estimate a population pro-
portion. Since there were ortly two possible outcomes, to form a grand 
coalition or not to form a grand coalition, a binomial sampling distri-
bution existed. That is, each possible outcome had a 50 percent 
probability of occurrence. The parameter that had to be estimated by 
a confidence interval was the proportion of grand coalitions that would 
form or the probability that a randomly salected group would form a grand 
coalition. 
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Even though confidence intervals are based on the normal distribu-
tion they can serve as an approximation to a binomial distribution. 2 
The 95 percent confidence interval is defined as follows: 
p + z (normal)~(l - r> 
- .OS n 
(1) 
where p is the observed proportion of groups that formed grand coalitions 
(estimate of the mean, p); z. 05 is the table value required for 'signifi-
cance at the S percent level; n is the sample size; and p(l - p)/n is 
an estimate of the variance. The 95 percent confidence interval was 
calculated as follows: 
23 
23 





(.814 < p < 1.00) 
The binomial distribution test above was affected by the sample 
size. Statisticians generally suggest a sample size of 30, with a 
minimum of 15 in the smaller class, when confidence intervals for 
normal approximation are applied to a binomial distribution that has a 
4 mean probability of .5 in the larger class. A table of Confidence 
5 
Belts for Proportions was also utilized to increase the credence of 
the confidence intervals. The use of confidence belts did not eliminate 
2 Robert G. D. Steel and James H. Terrie, Principles and Procedures 
of Statistics (New York, 1960), p. 353. 
3 
The calculated value of the upper limit was 1.026. 
probability could not be greater than 1.00, that was used 
limit. 
4 Steel, p. 354. 
5 Ibid, pp. 354 and 458. 
Since the 
as the upP.er 
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the limitation created by the small sample size. They did, however, serve 
as support for any inferences made based on the binomial distribution test. 
The Table of Confidence Belts for Proportions can be utilized for 
sample sizes as small as eight. For the 95 percent confidence interval, 
(.74 < p < 1.00) was obtained from the table. Thus the two methods used 
to determine confidence intervals, normal distribution as an approxima-
tion to a binomial distribution and confidence belts for proportions, 
yielded similar results. 
The confidence intervals indicated that the population proportion, 
the probability of a grand coalition forming among all possible partie!-
pants given a gaming environment identical to the gaming environment of 
this research study, would lie between .74 and 1.0 with 95 percent 
confidence. Since the unknown population proportion was apparently 
greater than .SO (the probability of a grand coalition forming), the 
behavior of the subjects with respect to the bargaining theory of 
coalition formation was confirmed. 
Core Theory 
The second hypothesis of this dissertation study was that the 
solution observed from each group would be in core. Ninety-two percent 
of the solutions supported this hypothesis. 
Each observation was evaluated in association with the three 
rationality conditions required for a core solution. The three 
rationality conditions were: 
1. Each division, to remain in the grand coalition, must 
receive a payoff (cost savings in this study) that is at 
least as great as the cost savings he could receive acting 
alone. 
2. The grand coalition must allocate the total benefit (cost 
savings) of cooperation to the divisions. 
3. Every possible coalition must behave rationally. That is, 
the cost savings allocated to·:each division must be at 
least as great as the benefit of their cooperation. 
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The participants in the experiment reported the allocation of joint 
costs. Core theory is addressed from the viewpoint of the partitioning 
of a payoff or benefit, which was cost savings in this research study. 
Cost savings were the dollars a division, or divisions, saved by 
selecting a less costly alternative rather than a more costly alternative. 
For example, the cost to Division A for acting alone was $2,610. If 
another alternative were available that was less than $2,610 and the 
manager of Division A selected that alternative, the cost savings would 
be the difference between the $2,610 and the cost to Division A liad the 
alternative been selected. Thus, the observed joint cost allocations 
were converted to cost savings allocation for the core evaluation process. 
The conversion of the observed joint cost allocations to cost 
savings allocations involved three steps. The first step required a 
calculation of the cost allocated to each division based on the cost 
of the alternative each division manager selected. For example, in 
group number 21, the manager of Division A selected the alternative of 
forming a grand coalition. The division manager agreed to incur 45 
percent (.45 from Table I) of the total joint costs, $5,010, for forming 
a grand coalition. Thus, the joint cost allocation to Division A in 
group 21 was $2,255 ($5,010 x .45). 
Step two involved the calculation of the cost of Division A in 
group 21 acting alone. In this case the cost was $2,610. 
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The final step was the calculation of the cost savings for Division 
A in group 21. The cost of forming a grand coalition (the alternative 
selected) was $2,255; the cost of acting alone was $2,610 (the foregone 
alternative). Thus, the cost savings to Division A in group 21 was the 
difference in the cost of the two alternatives, $355 ($2,610 - $2,255). 
The conversion process was performed for each division in the 
first 23 groups. Groups 24 and 25 were not involved in the conversion 
process nor were they evaluated for the three core conditions. Since 
both groups, 24 and 25, did not form grand coalitions, the division 
managers made decisions that were suboptimal at the company level. The 
decisions were suboptimal from a company viewpoint, because the division 
managers in groups 24 and 25 failed to save the company the maximum 
amount possible. The cost of forming a grand coalition was $5,010; the 
cost of each division acting alone totaled $5,710 ($2,6iO + $2,030 
+ $1,070). Thus, the division managers in groups 24 and 25 neglected 
the opportunity to save the company $700 ($5,710- $5,010). The other 
possible coalition formations afforded the company cost savings which 
were all less than $700. Therefore, the division managers of groups 24 
and 25 behaved in a manner, other than rational, and neither group was 
employed in the remainder of the data analyses. 
Table II contains a summary of the conversion of the joint cost 
allocations to cost savings allocations by division. All 23 observed 
allocation schemes evaluated met the first condition for a core solution. 
The cost savings received by each division, within a group, exceeded the 
cost savings each division could receive acting alone. 
No cost savings were available if a division acted alone. Thus, 
to meet the first condition for a core solution required a division to 
TABLE II 
CONVERSION OF JOINT COST ALLOCATIONS TO COST SAVINGS ALLOCATIONS BY DIVISION 
Observed Total Joint Cost Cost 
Joint Cost Cost to Joint of Savings 
Group Allocation Grand Cost Acting Cost Converted to 
Number Percentage X Coalition Allocation Alone Savings Decimal* 
Division A 
1-20 .48 $5,010 $2,405 $2,610 $205 .29 
21 .45 $5,010 $2,255 $2,610 $355 .. 51 
22 .45 $5,010 $2,255 $2,610 $355 .51 
23 . 47 $5,010 $2,354 $2,610 $256 . 37 
Division B 
1-20 . 35 $5,010 $1,753 $2,030 $277 .40 
21 . 36 $5,010 $1,804 $2,030 $226 .32 
22 • 35 $5,010 $1,753 $2,030 $277 .40 
23 . 36 $5,010 $1,804 $2,030 $226 . 32 
Divis:i,on C 
l-20 .17 $5,010 $ 852 $1,070 $218 . 31 
21 .19 $5,010 $ 951 $1,070 $119 .17 
22 .20 $5,010 $1,002 $1,070 $ 68 .09 
23 .17 $5,010 $ 852 $1,070 $218 .31 
*This column represents the division's cost savings as a percentage of the total cost savings 




receive one dollar, or more, of coAt savings. Division C in group 23 
received $218 of cost savings (from Table II). The $218 exceeded the 
zero dollars of cost savings from acting alone. Table III contains a 
summary of the evaluation of the cost savings allocations in regards to 
the first condition for a core solution. 
TABLE III 
INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY CONDITION 
Division A Division B Division C 
Group Grand Grand Grand 
Number Coalition Alone Coalition Alone Coalition Alone 
1-20 $205 > 0 $277 > 0 $218 > 0 
21 $355 > 0 $226 > 0 $119 > 0 
22 $355 > 0 $277 > 0 $ 68 > 0 
23 $256 > 0 $226 > 0 $218 > '0 
The second core condition required the grand coalition to allocate 
the total cost savings. Cost savings were the difference between the 
cost of forming a grand coalition, $5,010, and the cost of each division 
acting alone, $5,710, or $700. 
To meet the second core condition, each group had to allocate $700 
of cost savings to the three divisions within each group. The cost 
savings allocations disclosed in Table II were totaled for each group to 
determine whether $700 of cost savings were allocated. Group 21 did 
allocate $700: Division A, $355; Division B, $226; and Division C, $119. 
Table IV contains the results of the summation process. 
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TABLE IV 
TOTAL COST SAVINGS BY GROUP 
Group Division 
Number A B c Total 
1-20 $205 $277 $218 $700 
21 $355 $226 $119 $700 
22 $355 $277 $ 68 $700 
23 $256 $226 $218 $700 
The third, and final, condition for an allocation scheme to be in 
core is that each feasible coalition (excluding the grand coalition) 
behave rationally. That is, the payoffs (cost savings) allocated to 
each division within a coalition, must be as great as the benefit (cost 
savings) of their cooperation. Three coalitions were feasible, A and 
B, A and C, and B and C. A division acting alone was not feasible 
because no cost savings were available when doing so. 
Table V reflects the results of the group rationality comparisons. 
The total cost savings from forming a grand coalition received by each 
division of a feasible coalition. Group rationality required that the 
cost savings from the grand coalition be equal to or greater than the 
cost savings that accrued from the feasible coalition. In each case, 
the grand coalition cost savings were greater than those from the 
feasible coalition. 
Divisions A and B would have received $380 in cost savings if they 
had formed a coalition. The $380 was the difference between the cost of 
TABLE V 
COALITION RATIONALITY CONDITION 
Coalition Coalition Coalition 
AB AC BC 
Cost Cost Cost 
Savings Savings Savings 
Allocated to Allocated to Allocated to 
Division Cost Division Cost . Division Cost 
A_and B from Savings A and C from Savings A and C from Savings 
Group the Grand from the Grand from the Grand from 
Number Coalition Coalition AB Coalition Coalition AC Coalition Coalition BC 
1-20 $482 > $380 $423 > $290 $495 > $265 - -
21 581 > 380 474 > 290 345 > 265 - -22 632 > 380 423 > 290 345 > 265 -23 482 > 380 474 > 290 444 > 265 - -
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both divisions acting alone $4,640 (Division A, $2,610 and Division B, 
$2,030) and the joint cost of forming a coalition which was $4,260. 
The cost savings from forming coalition AB were compared with the 
cost savings Divisions A and B received from forming the grand coalition. 
For example, in group 22 Division A received #355 of cost savings from 
forming a grand coalition, while Division B received $277 of cost 
savings. The total cost savings for Division A and B, $632 exceeded the 
$380 of cost savings they would have received from forming coalition AB. 
Therefore the coalition AB in group 22 behaved rationally and thus met 
the third condition required for a core solution. 
The cost savings allocations reported by the subjects met the three 
requirements for a core solution. Each surrogate division manager 
behaved rationally because each division received cost savings that 
exceeded the cost savings a division would receive acting alone. The 
total cost savings from forming a grand coalition, $700, was allocated 
to each division within every group. Finally, each feasible coalition 
(coalitions AB, AC, and BC) behaved rationally. That is, each feasible 
coalition received a greater amount of cost savings from the grand 
coalition than they would have received from another feasible coalition. 
Thus, the second hypothesis of this research study that the observed 
allocation schemes would be core solutions, was strongly supported. 
Cost Allocation Schemes 
The third hypothesis of this research study was that the cost 
savings allocation reported by the students would approximate a game 
theoretic solution. The results of the experiment did not support the 
hypothesis that a game theoretic allocation scheme would be followed by 
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the subjects. The results did however support the hypothesis that one 
of five joint cost allocation schemes would be approximated by the 
subjects. One allocation scheme, Activity Level, appeared to be used 
by the subjects. Twenty of the groups that formed grand coalitions 
reported allocations that were exact Activity Level solutions. 
The evaluation process which led to this conclusion involved a 
comparison of the observed cost savings allocations and five known 
allocation schemes. The five known allocation schemes were the Shapley, 
Bargaining Theory--Initial Trial, Bargaining Theory--Asymptote, Activity 
Level and Moriarity. Only the first three known solutions, the Shapley 
and the two Bargaining Theory models, were game theoretic allocation 
schemes. 
Each of the known allocation schemes was applied to the cost data 
employed in the experiment. Solutions were derived, which resulted in 
a cost savings allocation to each of the three divisions, A, B, and C. 
For example, the solution for the Mor.iarity model was: Division A, • 46 
6 of the total cost savings; Division B, .36; and Division C, .18. The 
solution vector was (.46, .36, .18), which was compared with a vector of 
the mean observed cost savings allocations (.31, .39, .30). The solution 
vectors of the observed cost savings allocations; (Refer to Appendix D 
for the calculation of solutions for the known allocation schemes.) 
Table VI discloses the solution vectors for the known allocation schemes 
and the mean vector of the observed cost savings allocations. 
6 All 23 groups of subjects formed a grand coalition, thus the total 
cost savings that was allocated was $700. The total joint cost for 
forming a grand coalition was $5,010; the total cost of each division 
acting alone was $5,710 (Division A, $2,630; Division B, $2,030; and 
Division C, $1,070). The difference between the $5,710 and the $5,010 
was $700, the total cost savings. 
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TABLE. VI 
SOLUTION VECTORS AND OBSERVED MEAN VECTOR OF COST SAVINGS ALLOCATIONS 
Division 
Allocation Scheme A B c 
Shapley • 37 . 35 .28 
Bargaining Theory - Initial Trial • 40 .35 .25 
Bargaining. Theery - Asymptote .42 .38 .20 
Activity Level .29 . 40 • 31 
Moriarity .46 • 36 .18 
Observed Mean .31 .39 • 30 
Hotelling's T2 , which is approximated by an F value, was used to 
test the results of five comparisons. The mean vector of the observed 
cost savings allocations was compared with the five known solution 
vectors. For testing purposes, the mean vector of the observed cost 
savings (.31, .39, .30) was compared with the Shapley solution vector 
(.37, .35, .28). A Hotelling's T2 statistic was computed and transformed 
into an F value. The calculated F value was compared to the· tabular F 
values at the generally accepted levels of significance, .005, .010, 
.025, .050, and .100. When the calculated F value exceeded the tabular 
F value, the inference was made that a significant difference existed 
between the mean vector of the observed cost savings and the Shapley 
solution vector. For example, the calculated F value for the comparison 
of the mean vector of the observed cost savings and the Shapley solution 
vector was 425.225. The calculated F value exceeded the tabular F 
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7 values at .005 (5.82), .010 (4.94), .025 (3.86), .050 (3.10), and .100 
(2.38), thus the two vectors were significantly different at all the 
generally accepted significanc~ levels. The inference was that the 
subjects' reported cost savings allocation schemes did not approximate 
a Shapley allocation scheme. 
The preceding procedure was utilized for the other four allocation 
schemes, Bargaining Theory--Initial Trial, Bargaining Theory--Asymptote, 
Activity Level, and Moriarity. For the purpose of testing whether the 
observed cost savings allocation schemes approximated a game theoretic 
allocation scheme, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
Ho: ll = eo 
Ha: ll :f ~o 
ll was the mean vector of the observed cost saving allocations and 
ll0 was the vector of one of the five known solutions. Thus, ll was the 
same for the five comparisons, while ll was changed for each comparison 
0 
to the solution vector that was associated with the known solutions; the 
Shapley, Bargaining Theory--Initial Trial, Bargaining Theory--Asymptote, 
Activity Level, and Moriarity. Table VII contains a summary of the 
statistical results of the five comparisons at the .100 level of 
significance. 
The results of the Hotelling's T2 statistical test were quite 
clear. Only the Activity Level allocation scheme was not significant 
at the .100 level of significance. Even at the .005 level of signifi-
cance, the Activity Level allocation scheme was not significant. 
Therefore, the inference as a result of the Hotelling's T2 statistic 
7 Steel, p. 438. 
51 
was that the Activity Level allocation was most closely approximated by 
the subjects. The hypothesis that a game theoretic allocation would be 






Allocation Scheme F d. f. cant cance Level 
Shapley 1,403.242 425.225 3,20 yes .100 
Bargaining Theory--
. Initial Trial 1,210.100 366.697 3,20 yes .100 
Bargaining Theory--
Asymptote 106.405 32.244 3,20 yes .100 
Activity Level 3.300 1.000 3,20 no .100 
Moriarity 500.256 151.593 3,20 yes .100 
Since the Hotelling's T2 test statistic used·mean data, a 
possibility existed that observations that were extremely different 
from the mean could have had a distorting impact on the test statistic. 
Therefore, a x2 test was also employed to evaluate the observed cost 
savings allocations. x2 was defined by the following equation: 
2 E (observed frequency - expected frequency) 
expected frequency 
The observed frequency was the number of observed cost savings 
allocation schemes that most closely approximated one of the known 
(2) 
allocation schemes. The expected frequency was the probability of a 
8 
known allocation scheme's occurrence, 20 percent, times the sample 
size, 23. Thus, the expected frequency was 4.6 (.20 x 23). 
The determination of the observed frequency required an involved 
process. Each observed cost savings allocation scheme was compared 
with the five known allocation schemes on the basis of, squared and 
summed, numerical differences. Table II contains a summary of the 
observed cost savings allocations. These cost savings allocations 
were then compared with the five known allocation schemes_for the 
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Shapley, Bargaining Theory--Initial Trial, Bargaining Theory--Asymptote, 
Activity Level and Moriarity from Table VI. 
For example, group 21 reported the following cost savings allocation: 
Division A, .51, Division B, .32, and Division 3, .17. This cost savings 
allocation was compared with each of the five known solutions from 
Table VI. Thus, the comparison with the Shapley solution, Division A, 
.37, Division B, .35, Division C, .28, was: 
2 ( . 2 ( )2 (.51 - .37) + .32 - .35) + .17 - .28 = .0326 
The same procedure was repeated using the other four known solutions. 
The entire process was completed for each group and is represented in 
Table VIII. 
The most closely approximated known allocation scheme was judged 
as the scheme with the lowest sum of squared differences. For example, 
8 . . The probability of occurrence for each of the five known alloca-
tion schemes was 1/5 or 20 percent. In other words, each known 
allocation scheme had an equal probability of occurrence. 
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group 22 most closely approximated a Moriarity allocation scheme because 
Moriarity had the lowest sum of squared differences, .0122. 
TABLE VIII 
SUM OF SQUARED DIFFERENCES 
Allocation Scheme 
Bargaining Bargaining 
Group Theory-Initial Theory- Activity 
Number Shap.ley Trial ··Asymptote Level Moriarity 
1-20 .0098 .0182 .0294 .0000* .0474 
21 . 0326 . 0194 ·0126 ·0744 .0042* 
22 .0582 .0402· -0206 ·0968 .0122* 
23 .0018* .0054 .0182 ·0128 . 0266 
Total* 1.0 o.o o.o 20 2.0--
*Indicates the allocation scheme mosJ: closely approximated by each 
group. 
An asterisk was used to reflect the most closely approximated 
known allocation scheme for each group. The number of asterisks was 
totaled for each known allocation scheme (e.g., Shapley, 1.0). The 
total asterisks per known allocation scheme served as the observed 
frequencies for the x2 test. 
For the purpose of testing the sampling distribution, which was 
hypothesized as being a uniform distribution, the following hypothesis 
was formulated: 
H : 7T = 20% 
0 
H : 7T of 20% a 
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n was the probability of a known allocation scheme being most closely 
approximated. Since five known allocation schemes were involved in the 
experiment each scheme hada 1/5 (20 percent) probability of occurrence. 
x2 was calculated as follows: 
2 2 2 (1.0 - 4.6) + {20.0 - 4.6) + {2.0 - 4.6) 
4.6 4.6 4.6 
55.843 d.f. = 4 
2 The calculation of X only involved the Shapley t Activity Level t and 
Moriarity because only those three known allocation schemes had observed 
frequencies greater than zero. 
The x2 statistic was significant at the .10 level of significance. 
The null hypothesis was rejected. It was concluded that the distribution 
was not a uniform distribution. 
The small sample size, 23 observationst had an effect ·on the power 
of the x2 statistical test employed in this research study. The power 
of a statistical test is the probability of accepting the alternative 
hypothesis (rejecting the null hypothesis) when the alternative 
hypothesis is true. Statisticians assert that the power of the test 
increases as the sample size increases. Since the sample size in this 
2 . 
research study was small, the power of the X statistical test employed 
was apparently low. 
2 The calculation of the X statistic required the actual number of 
observations, 23t and an estimate of the expected number of observations 
per allocation scheme. The expected number of observationsper alloca-
tion scheme was estimate~ by the product of the actual number of 
observations and the probability of occurrence of each allocation scheme. 
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Five allocation schemes were employed in this research study and 
each scheme had an equal probability of occurrence. Thus, each scheme 
had a 20 percent probability of occurrence. Therefore, the expected 
number of observations for each allocation scheme was 4.6 (23 x 20%). 
Cochran stated that if any expected number of observations was 
less than one, or if more than 20 percent of the expected number of 
observations was less than five, the x2 statistical test could be poor 
9 at low levels of significance. However, he further stated that there 
was little disturbance to the 5 percent level of significance when a 
single expectation was as low as .5 and two expectations were as low as 
1 for fewer degrees of freedom than 11. 10 
2 
The degrees of freedom for the X statistical test employed in this 
research study was 4 and the expected number of observations per alloca-
tion scheme was 4.6. The 10 percent level of significance was used for 
2 the X test as a means of precaution due to the apparently low power of 
the test, the limited number of expected observations per allocation 
scheme and the low number of degrees of freedom. 
Tte Activity Level allocation scheme contributed 92 percent 
(;~:~~;) of the x2 test statistic. 11 Thus, the results of the x2 test 
provided additional evidence supporting the inference that the 
9w. J. Conover, Practical Nonparametric Statistics (New York, 1971), 
p. 152. 
10 Robert G. D. Steel and James H. Torrie, Principals and Procedures 





2 X test statistic was calculated by summarizing 
2 frequency - expected frequency) 
expected frequency 
schemes. The Activity Level portion was 
for each of the five known 
(20.0 - 4.6)2 
4.6 or 
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Activity Level allocation scheme was most closely approximated by the 
subjects. 
Summary 
Bargaining theory of coalition formation, which predicted that 
grand coalitions would be formed by the subjects, received strong 
support based on the results of the experiment. Twenty-three of 25 
groups, 92 percent, employed in the laboratory experiment formed grand 
coalitions. Confidence intervals were determined using both the normal 
distribution as an approximation to a binomial distribution and confi-
12 dence belts for proportions~ to evaluate the 9'2 percent response . rate 
of the subjects. The probability that a randomly selected group would 
form a grand coalition was contained within each confidence interval 
at the .95 level of confidence. Thus the apparent population proportion 
was substantially greater than the probability of a grand coalition 
forming, .50. Since 92 percent of the groups did form grand coalitions, 
the prediction that grand coalitions would form was substantiated. 
Twenty-three of the observed cost savings allocation schemes were 
schemes which were in core. All 23 observed solutions met the three 
rationality conditions required for a solution to be in the core. 
The observed cost savings allocation schemes most closely 
approximated the Activity Level allocation scheme. Two statistical 
2 2 
tests, a Retelling's T and a X test of goodness of fit, were utilized 
to evaluate the data. Both test results clearly implied that the 
12 Response in this sense represents the subjects' selecting to 
form grand coalitions rather than selecting other available alternatives. 
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Activity Level allocation scheme was most closely approximated by the 
subjects. Therefore, no apparent support was observed for the hypothesis 
that a game theoretic allocation scheme would be approximated by the 
subjects. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to evaluate the behavior of 
subjects, acting as surrogate division managers, in a joint cost 
allocation setting where cost savings were available to each division 
manager. The subjects' observed behavior was evaluated in association 
with three elements of game theory: coalition formation, core theory, 
and game theoretic cost allocation schemes. 
The results of the research study were mixed; which coalition 
formation and core theory were strongly supported, evidence did not 
support the hypothesis that a game theoretic allocation scheme would be 
approximated by the groups. Even though the results of the research 
study were not as expected, some useful conclusions and implications 
surfaced as a consequence. 
Summary of Findings 
Coalition Formation 
Twenty-three groups behaved as anticipated with respect to the 
bargaining theory of coalition formation. Bargaining theory of coalition 
formation predicted that the most likely coalition to form was a grand 
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coalition. Ninety-two percent of the groups behaved as predicted; 
23 of the 25 groups sampled, formed grand coalitions. 
Coalition formation is the initial action in a game theory setting. 
If the players had not formed the predicted coalitions, their remaining 
actions would not have been within the rules of game theory, and thus 
no further evaluation of the data would have been worthwhile. The 
results were supportive of bargaining theory, thus inferring that 
positive evidence was provided by the experiment. 
Core Theory 
The experiment results also supported core theory. All of the 
groups that formed grand coalitions provided solutions that met the 
three rationality conditions for a core solution. 
Core solutions are important in a game theoretic framework because 
1 such solutions indicate rationality and fairness. Also core solutions 
are allocations that avoid suboptimal decisions on the corporate level 
due to decisions made on the division level. These criteria provide a 
sense of stability to a solution. If a stable solution were not 
available, it is doubtful .if players would participate in a game. Thus, 
if no stable solution exists, a unique solution would not be available. 
If game theory is to provide a solution to the allocation problem 
in joint cost settings, unique solutions are required. Twenty-three 
groups provided core solutions which implied that the subjects acted in 
a rational manner. The experiment, then, provided positive evidence of 
1Rationality and fairness are measures of acceptance of an alloca-
tion scheme as viewed by external users of data and decision makers 
(the players). 
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another necessary element of game theory, core theory, as it applies to 
joint cost allocation situations. 
Cost Allocation Schemes 
Finally, after having evaluated the subjects' behavior in terms of 
coalition formation and core theory, their behavior was evaluated for 
compatibility with five joint cost allocation schemes. The observed 
cost savings allocation schemes were compared with three game theoretic 
cost allocation schemes, the Shapley, Bargaining Theory--Initial Trial, 
and Bargaining Theory--Asymptote; and two non-game theoretic cost 
allocation schemes, Activity Level and Moriarity. The anticipated 
behavior of the subjects was that their reported cost savings allocations 
would most closely approximate a game theoretic cost allocation scheme. 
2 2 Retelling's T and X test statistics were employed to evaluate the 
observed cost savings allocations for cost allocation scheme preference. 
The results indicated that the groups of subjects allocated costs in a 
manner which most closely approximated the Activity Level technique. 
Thus, on average no evidence that a game theoretic cost allocation was 
approximated by the subjects was observed. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The subjects behaved in the anticipated manner in terms of coalition 
formation and core theory. Even more interestingly, the subjects behaved 
as anticipated having had no knowledge of bargaining theory and the 
criteria for a core solution. Thus, the subjects' behavior observed in 
this research study, evaluated in regards to coalition formation and 
core theory, was viewed as a positive step in the direction of game 
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theory and its applicability to joint cost allocation situations where 
a benefit is perceived by the players. 
Even though game theoretic cost allocation schemes were not used 
by the subjects, the results of the evaluation of the observed cost 
savings allocations provided an implication about game theory. The 
implication was that possible users of game theory in joint cost 
allocation situations similar to that present in this research study may 
require exposure to game theory and game theoretic solutions before these 
types of results can be expected. 
The researcher recommends. that further research be done with game 
theory in joint cost allocation situations where a benefit is perceived 
by the players. Future research could proceed along any of the 
following lines. First, replications of this research study could be 
undertaken. Second, researchers might use business sector division 
managers, instead of students, as subjects. Third, other types of game 
theoretic cost allocation schemes such as Nash, Nucleolus, and Minimum 
Resource Theory as measures of evaluation, would be useful. Further 
research in these areas might provide empirical sup.port for the use of 
game theoretic allocation schemes as a partial solution to the allocation 
problem in joint cost allocation situations, the selection and justifi-
cation of the particular allocation method employed. 
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Game Theory Te~inology 
1. Activity Level Allocation Scheme--cost is allocated to each player 
(usually a division of a corporation) in direct proportion to the 
player's activity level. 
2. Bargaining Theory--This tenet suggests that players in a gaming 
situation use their best payoff in another coalition as a threat to 
improve their payoff in a current coalition. 
3. Caplow's Prediction Theory--The initial distribution of resources is 
the primary element in the prediction of coalition formation. His 
major assumption is that each player will choose the coalition that 
maximizes the number of players he controls. 
4. Core Theory--The set of imputations that require for players to be 
content in a coalition, they must receive at least the amount they 
can command regardless of what players outside of the coalition can do. 
5. Dominance--One imputation dominates another imputation if it is both 
feasible and preferred. 
A. Feasible 
v(T) > !:yi 
i in T 
B. Preferred 
yi > xi for all i in T 
V(T) - coalition T 
y - imputation y = (yl' Yz' ... ' yn) 
X - imputation X = (xl' xz, ... ' xn) 
6. Grand Coalition--It is the group (coalition) Ci!Omposed of all the 
players in a game. 
7. Imputation--Any payoff that satisfies the following two rationality 
conditions is an imputation. 
A. Individual rationality--No player will accept a final payoff less 
than the least he can receive if he were to play alone against a 
coalition of all the other players. 
B. Group rationality:.::..No gro\ip"o.f players will accept a total payoff 
that is less than the total of each of their individual payoffs. 
8. Minimum Resource Theory--A player will expect the other players to 
demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the 
amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition. 
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9. Moriarity Allocation Scheme--The cost allocated to each player is 
equal to the difference between his independent cost and a specific 
fraction of the total value obtained by forming the grand coalition. 
10. Move--A move is the set of choices a player has at a particular 
decision point. 
11. Nash Solution--This allocation scheme requires that the following 
properties be met: 
A. Invariance with respect to utility transformations. 
B. The bargained value must be at least as good as the players 
acting alone, it must be· feasible, and it must be be·tter than 
any other feasible point. 
C. Independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
D. The game must be symmetric (i.e., equal utility payoffs). 
12. Non-zero-sum game--A game in which the payoffs to the players does 
not sum to zero is a non-zero-sum game. 
13. Nucleolus Allocation Scheme--This is a solution that is based on 
the criterion of Pareto Optimality. The minimum surplus (i.e., 
synergy or cost savings) over all coalitions is maximized. An 
antinucleolus solution minimizes the maximum surplus. 
14. Payoff matrix--It is a · set of associate outcomes. 
Player 2 
Player 1 :~ ~:: ::~ 
15. Pivotal Power Theory--A player's resources are pivotal when their 
inclusion in a losing coalition can convert it into a winning 
coalition. The theory predicts that all coalitions are equally 
likely and the payoffs divided equally when one player cannot win 
by himself. 
16. Player--A player is a participant in a game. 
17. Shapley Allocation Scheme--This solution is based on pivotal power 
theory. Thus, as the grand coalition forms by the sequential 
addition of players, each player is charged an amount equal to the 
expected marginal cost incurred when the player enters. 
18. von Neumann-Morgenstern--Their book, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior serves as a prelude to the theory of interest conflict in 
the behavior sciences. They developed the basic game theory 
reasoning (i'.e., basically rationality axioms) that has led to the 
development of the various allocation schemes. 
19. Zero-sum game--A game where the sum of payoffs to the players is 
zero is a zero-sum game. 
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APPENDIX B 
COST DATA AND DIVISION REQUIREMENTS 
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Cost Data and Division Requirements 













Division A--Using an outside computer firm 
Division B--Using an outside computer firm 
Division C--Using an outside computer firm 
Divisions A and B--Using an outside computer firm 
Divisions A and c--Using an outside computer firm 
Divisions B and c--Using an outside computer firm 
Divisions A, B, and C--Using Division D 




Divisions A and B together 
Divisions A and C together 
Divisions B and C together 





















Coalition formation is predicted by bargaining theory. Bargaining 
theory postulates that the most likely coalition to form is the one that 
minimizes members' temptation to defect. 
Expected Payoffs (Based on Computer Hours Required Per Week): 
Coalition 
Division Hours AB AC BC ABC 
A 20 20/35 = 56% 20/27 = 71% 20/42 = 46% 
B 15 15/35 44% 15/22 = 65% 15/42 = 36% 
c 7 7/27 29% 7/22 = 35% 
Temptation Factors: 
oij =predicted payoff to division i in coalition j. 
Eij =maximum expectation ip:alternative coalitions . 
AB = (.56 - 0 71) + (.44 - • 65). = -.36 
AC = (. 71,- 0 56). + (.29·- 0 35) = .09 
BC = (.65 .44) + (. 35 - . 29) = .27 
ABC = (.46 .71) + (.36 .65) + ( .18 - .35) = -. 71 
* the most likely coalition to form. ABC is 
* 
7/42 = 18% 
APPENDIX D 
COST ALLOCATION SOLUTIONS 
AND CORE THEORY 
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Characteristic Function: 
V(A) = $2,610 
V(B) = $2,030 
V(C) "" $1,070 
Hours Per Week: 
Division A = 20 
Division B = 15 
Division C = 7 
Total 42 
V(ABC) = $5,010 
V(AB) = $4,260 
V(AC) - $3,390 
V(BC) = $2,835 
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Cost Allocation Solutions and Core Theory 
A. Shapley Solution (Game Theoretic) 
axioms: 
1. The value should be determined by the characteristic function 
and be independent· of. how'< the players are labelled. 
2. The set of values to the·n players should be an imputation. 
3. If two games are merged into one, the value·of·the new game 
should be the sum of the two original games. 
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There is only one vector of payoffs that satisfies the above axioms, thus 
the Shapley Solution results in a unique value to the game. 
E:(A) = s! (n~~-1)! [V(A)l + s!(n~~-1)! 
+ s I (n-s-1)! [V(AB) - V(B)] n!. . 
[V(AC) - V(C)] + s! (n-s-l}! 
n! 
[V(ABC) - V(BC)] 
E:(A) = expected payoff to Division A. 
s! (n-s-1) l n! = the probability that Division A will join the coalition. 
s! = the possible arrangements of divisions already in the 
coalition before Division A. 
(n-s-1)! = the possible arrangements of divisions who join the 
coalition after Division A. 
n! = number of different ways the coalition can be formed. 
E(A) = 1/3($2,610) + 1/6($2,230) + 1/6($2,320) + 1/3($2,175) 
E(A) = $2,354 
£(B) = 1/3(V(B)] + 1/6[V(AB) - V(B)] + 1/6[V(BC) - V(C)] + 
l/3[V(ABC) - V(AC)] 
E(B) = 1/3($2,030] + 1/6($1,650) + 1/6($1,756) + 1/3($1,620) 
E(B) = $1,786 
E(C) = 1/3[V(C)] + 1/6[V(AC) - V(A)] + 1/6[V(BC) - V(B)] + 
l/3[V(ABC) - V(AB)] 
E(C) = 1/3[$1,070] + 1/6[$780] + 1/6[$805} + 1/3[$750] 
E(C) = $871 
Cost Savings (Xi) Allocation 
XA = V(A) - £(A) 
XA = $2,610 - $2,354 . 
XA = $256 37% 
~ = V(B) - E(B) 
XB = $2,030 - $1,786 
XB = $244 
XC = V(C) - E(C) 
xc = $1,070 - $871 

















EXi ~ V(S) SC:N 
s 
where 
V(S) = I (Qi) - (I Qi) 
s s 
where 
I (Qi) the ith division's cost acting alone. 
s 
(I Qi) the cost of acting jointly. 
s 
V(S) = the joint cost savings. 
= $4,640 - $4,260 
$380 
$3,680 - $3,390 
= $290 




I Xi 2:_ V(S) S~N 
8 
AB BC 
$500 > $380 $444 > $265 
AC ABC 
$456 > $290 $700 = $700 
Thus, the Shapley Solution is in core. 
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B. Moriarity Allocation 
V~i) 
e:(i) = V(i) - i V(N) 
E V(i) 
i=A to C 
e:(A) = $2,610 - ~2,610 ($700) $5,710 
e(A) = $2,610 - .46($700) 
e:(A) = $2,610 - $320 
e:(A) = $2,290 
e:(B) = $2,030 - $2,030 ($700) 
$5 '710 
e:(B) = $2,030 - .35($700) 
e:(B) = $2,030 - $249 
e(B) $1,781 
e: (C) = $1 070 - $l,070 ($700) , $5,710 
e:(C) = $1,070 - .19($700) 
e:(C) = $1,070 - $131 
e:(C) = $939 
Cost Savings (Xi:) Allocation 
from above: 
X = A $320 46% 
X = B $249 36% 
X = c $131 18% 
Core Calculation 
i 
E e:(i) ~ ( E V(i)) for all S inN 
s i=A to C 
$5,010 < $5,710 
Thus, the Moriarity solution is in core. 
c. Activity Level 
E:(i) = .Jl!_ 




= 42 ($5,010) 
E:(A) = • 48 ($5, 010) 
E:(A) = $2,405 
E:(B) 15 = 42 ($5,010) 
E:(B) = . 35($5,010) 
E: (B) = $19.753 
7 E:(C) = 42 ($5,010) 
E: (C) = .17($5,010) 
E:(C) = $852 
Cost Savings (Xi) Allocation 
XA = V(A) - E:(A) 
XA = $2,610 - $2,405 
XA = $205 
XB = V(B) - £(B) 
XB = $2,030- $1,753 
XB = $277 
XC = V(C) - c:(C) 
XC = $1,070 - $852 
X = $218 c 
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l: e::(i) < (l: Qi) 
s s 
(l: Qi) = the cost of acting jointly 
9 
$5,010 = $5,010 
Thus, the Activity Level solution is in core. 
D. Bargaining Theory--Initial Trial (Game Theoretic) 
Parity and equality norms are followed by the players. Therefore, 
the payoff to e.ach player will be midway between parity (players percentage 
contribution) and equality. 
ABC = ($2,610 $2,030 $1,070) $5,010 , $5,010 ' $5,010 
ABC = (.52, • 41, • 21) 
adjusted to 100% 
ABC = ( • 46 , . 36 , • 18) 
Application of parity and equality norms: 
parity equality 
A: • 46 ~333 = .127 2 = .06 
B: • 36 .333 = .027 . 2 = .01 
c: .18 - .333 ~ ~.153 + 2 = -.08 
adjusted 
A: .46 - .06 = .40 
B: • 36 - • 01 = • 35 
C: .18 + .08 .25 
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Cost Savings (Xi) Allocation 
X = 
A 
$700 X .40 = $280 40% 
X = 
B 
$700 X .35 = $245 35% 
X = c $700 X .25 = $17.5 25% 
Core Calculation 
Xi ~ V({i}) for all i 
X = A $280 > 0 
X = B $245 > 0 
X = c $175 > 0 
n 
l: Xi = V(N) 
i=l 
$700 = $700 
l: Xi ~ V(S) for all S c N 
s 
AB 
$525 > $380 
AC 
$455 > $290 
BC 
$420 > $265 
Thus, Bargaining Theory--Initial Trial is in core. 
--~ 
E. Bargaining Theory--Asymptote (Game Theoretic) 




A = • 71 in (AB) 
B = .65 in (BC) 
C = • 35 in (BC) 
Adjusted to 100% 
~+~+~= 00 1.71 1.71 1.71 1• . 
• 42 + .38 + .20 ~ 1.00 
Savings (Xi) Allocation 
X = A .42 X $700 = $294 
X = 
B 
.38 X $700 ~ $266 
X = .20 X $700 = $140 c 
Calculation 
Xi ~ ({i}) 
XA = $294 > 0 
X = $266 > 0 B 
X = $175 > 0 c 
n 
L Xi = V(N) 
i=l 
$700 = $700 





L:Xi 2:._ V(S) 
AB 
$560 > $380 
AC 
$469 > $290 
BC 
$441 > $265 
for all S C N 






You are the manager of division (A, B, or C). The Corporation has 
recently developed a new division, D, which is strictly a computer 
service division. Division D leases its computer at a fixed rate of 
$5,010 per week. 
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In recent weeks the divisional weekly accounting and production reports, 
which are handwritten, have been received well past the due date 
(Monday morning, 9:00a.m.). Also, the corporate staff has had a 
difficult time integrating the divisional reports because the reports 
were not uniform. Therefore, corporate headquarters issued to each 
division manager·a memo stating that their quarterly bonuses would be 
reduced accordingly for any more tardy weekly reports. Also, a uniform 
format for the weekly reports was attached. It was also made clear in 
the memo that computer printed reports would be required. 
Today is Friday, the day division managers have just heard presentations 
from outside computer firms and from division D, the new computer 
division. (Cost estimates and each division's computer requirements 
are on page 2.) Each presented stressed that they could guarantee 
timely reports, one week from Monday, only if they could get started 
this afternoon. Therefore, time is of the essence. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
You as a division manager now face this dilemma: How to get weekly 
reports, computer printed, to the corporate office every Monday by 
9:00 a.m. 
Here are some additional considerations: 
1. You may decide to act alone, or form a group with one, or both, of 
the other division managers. 
2. One of the criteria used to evaluate your performance for determining 
your quarterly bonus is cost savings you can verify when making 
investment decisions. (i.e., Cost to make a raw material, $100; 
cost to buy the raw material, $75. If the decision maker buys the 
raw material, his cost savings would be $25.) 
The decision you must make is: 
1. What computer facility should your division use (either division D 
j: an outside facility)? 
2. If you and another, or both other divisions, decide to form a group, 
how should the cost (see attached cost figures) be allocated or 
partitioned to the using divisions? 
Cost Data and Division Requirements 





Cost Estimates Per Week: 
Division A- using 
Division B - using 




















Divisions A and B- using an outside computer 
Divisions A and c -
Divisions B and c -
Divisions A, B, and 




using an outside computer 
using an outside computer 
C - using Division D 
Divisions A and B together 
Divisions A and C together 
Divisions B and C together 




















Please answer the following questions by circling the correct response. 
1. What was your decision? 
A. To act alone. 
B. To form a group. 
If your answer to number 1 was A, stop. 
If your answer to number 1 was B, please answer the next two questions. 
2. What group was formed? 
A. A+ H 
B. A+ C 
C. B + C 
D. A + B + C 
3. How are the weekly costs to be allocated (divided up} to the members 





Briefly describe how you arrived at your decision. 
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Informed Consent by Subjects in Experiments 
I, ------------~~~--~--~----------------' have carefully read-
(Print Name) 
listened to (circle one) and fully understand the instructions for 
this experiment on Cost Allocation. I give my consent to serve as a 
subject in this experiment on I am aware 
(Date) 
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